The Addis Paradox and Ethiopia’s Zombie State

 

Why can a state that appears stable in its capital simultaneously be losing governing capacity across much of its territory?  This question captures a central puzzle in Ethiopia’s current political trajectory. Addis Ababa continues to function as a diplomatic hub and a showcase of modernization, while several regions of the country experience persistent armed conflict, disrupted public institutions, and growing insecurity. The coexistence of visible institutional vitality in the capital and fragmented governance across parts of the national territory is what I describe as the Addis Paradox. https://borkena.com/2026/03/11/the-addis-paradox-ethiopias-zombie-state/#google_vignette 

In my January 2026 article published in Borkena, I examined the moral legitimacy of the Fano insurgency through the framework of classical Just War Theory (Abate, 2026). That analysis addressed a normative question: under what conditions resistance against a state may acquire moral justification. Yet the discussion also raised a deeper empirical question concerning the condition of the Ethiopian state itself. If the state is the principal moral agent in such evaluations, what precisely is the condition of that state today?

Recent public debates increasingly frame Ethiopia through the language of state failure. In a 2025 discussion hosted by Anchor Media, legal scholar Yared Hailemariam examined Ethiopia’s trajectory against widely cited indicators of state fragility, including the erosion of territorial control, the proliferation of armed conflict across multiple regions, and mounting pressure on core public institutions. That discussion served as an immediate intellectual trigger for the present inquiry.

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED, 2025) classifies Ethiopia among the countries experiencing “extreme” levels of conflict intensity. Meanwhile, the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (2025) ranks Ethiopia 132nd out of 143 countries globally, reflecting persistent institutional weaknesses in judicial independence, civil liberties, and constraints on executive power.

Yet the concept of state failure does not fully capture a striking empirical contradiction. Addis Ababa continues to function as one of Africa’s major diplomatic capitals, hosting the African Union, numerous international organizations, and a large diplomatic community. In recent years, the Ethiopian government has invested heavily in high-profile urban development initiatives in Addis Ababa and in a few other regional sites, including monumental public parks, urban beautification programs, and tourism-oriented resorts. Projects such as Unity Park, Entoto Park, and Friendship Park have transformed parts of the capital into carefully curated urban landscapes designed to showcase modernization and national renewal. At the same time, the construction of a vast new national palace complex on the outskirts of Addis Ababa, which is widely described as one of the largest palace projects undertaken in contemporary Africa, has further reinforced the visual symbolism of state grandeur and authority. For many visitors, Addis Ababa is thus projecting an image of a rapidly modernizing capital.  

At the same time, several regions of the country experience persistent armed conflict, fragmented authority, massive internal displacement, targeted massacres, and disrupted public institutions. This contradiction is what I describe as the Addis Paradox: the coexistence of visible institutional functionality concentrated in the capital city and the simultaneous erosion of governing capacity across significant portions of the national territory.

This essay argues that Ethiopia may be more accurately understood not simply as a failed state but as a “zombie state”, a political system in which the institutional shell of sovereignty persists even as the social and administrative foundations of governance are progressively hollowed out. By advancing this diagnosis, the essay aims to provoke a more serious analytical debate about the structural condition of the Ethiopian state and to challenge conventional interpretations of the country’s ongoing political crisis.

From Failed State to Zombie State

The literature on fragile states identifies several core functions that define effective statehood. Robert Rotberg (2003) argues that states fail when they can no longer provide essential political goods such as security, rule of law, and basic public services. Similarly, Joel Migdal (1988) describes weak states as those unable to penetrate society effectively, regulate social relations, or mobilize resources. Under these frameworks, a failed state represents a condition in which the core institutions of governance collapse so extensively that the state ceases to operate as a coherent political authority.

Ethiopia’s contemporary condition does not fully correspond to this model. Despite persistent internal conflicts and territorial instability, the Ethiopian state continues to retain international diplomatic recognition, manage national economic policy, and maintain the formal operations of central bureaucratic institutions. Ethiopia’s current condition may therefore be more accurately understood not as that of a failed state but as that of a zombie state. The country’s core institutions have not collapsed in the classical sense associated with state failure. Instead, the institutional shell of sovereignty remains visible even as the relationship between territorial governance, public institutions, and the social contract has become increasingly strained.

A zombie state should therefore not be confused with either a weak state or a failed state. Unlike weak states, which lack administrative capacity but retain relatively coherent political authority, zombie states preserve the formal architecture of sovereignty while the underlying foundations of governance progressively erode. The concept captures a condition in which state institutions remain formally intact even as their capacity to sustain a coherent political order is gradually hollowed out.

The Zombie State Model

The notion of “zombie politics” has appeared in broader political commentary and critical theory, where it is often used to describe institutions that continue to operate formally even as their substantive purpose deteriorates. It is an analytical construction developed in dialogue with the literature on state fragility. It builds on the failed-state frameworks of Rotberg (2003) and Migdal (1988) while drawing inspiration from related concepts in other fields, particularly the idea of “zombie firms” in political economy, insolvent companies kept alive through continued credit support (Banerjee & Hofmann, 2018; BIS, 2018), as well as broader discussions of institutional persistence, where organizations may remain formally intact even as their functional effectiveness erodes (Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Applied to the level of the state, the concept describes a political system whose institutional structures remain visible even as their governing capacity progressively deteriorates.

The Zombie State Model proposed in this essay identifies several diagnostic characteristics that help distinguish such systems from both weak and failed states. These characteristics describe situations in which the institutional shell of the state remains visible while its governing capacity progressively deteriorates.

Institutional Shell Persistence: The formal architecture of sovereignty remains intact. Central ministries, diplomatic representation, and fiscal institutions continue to operate, projecting the appearance of a functioning state even as effective governance becomes increasingly constrained.

Territorial Governance Fragmentation: State authority becomes unevenly distributed across the national territory. While the central government retains formal sovereignty, governance in parts of the country is exercised through hybrid arrangements involving local militias, insurgent actors, or informal power structures.

External Financial Life-Support: External financial flows, from international financial institutions, bilateral partners, or strategic allies, help stabilize the macroeconomic foundations of the state, allowing institutional continuity despite persistent political crises.

Erosion of the Social Contract: Core public institutions such as courts, schools, and universities gradually lose their ability to function consistently across the national territory, weakening the state’s capacity to deliver basic political goods and maintain citizen trust.

Spectacular or Aesthetic Statehood: Governments invest heavily in highly visible urban development projects, monumental parks, flagship infrastructure, and tourism-oriented initiatives, that project images of modernization and vitality even as governing capacity erodes elsewhere.

 

Indicators of Zombification in Ethiopia

The diagnostic characteristics outlined in the Zombie State Model provide a framework for examining whether Ethiopia’s current political condition reflects the dynamics of zombie statehood. When viewed through this analytical lens, several developments in recent years appear consistent with the patterns identified above. Large parts of the country have experienced sustained armed conflicts and civil wars involving federal forces, regional militias, and insurgent movements, producing conditions in which state authority has become uneven across significant portions of the national territory. At the same time, the state continues to maintain diplomatic visibility, centralized administrative institutions, and macroeconomic stabilization efforts supported in part by external financial assistance. These seemingly contradictory developments illustrate the dynamics described in the zombie state model. The following sections examine these developments in greater detail.

Territorial Fragmentation and Remote Governance

Recent conflicts illustrate the uneven distribution of authority across Ethiopia. The 2020–2022 war in Tigray fundamentally disrupted federal authority in northern Ethiopia, producing one of the most devastating conflicts in contemporary Africa (International Crisis Group 2021; United Nations Human Rights Council 2022). Although the Pretoria Peace Agreement (November 2022) formally ended large-scale hostilities, governance in parts of the region remains fragile and contested (International Crisis Group 2023).

In Amhara, relations between federal authorities and local militia networks deteriorated sharply during 2023–2024, producing armed confrontations between federal forces and Fano militia groups and prompting the declaration of a nationwide state of emergency in August 2023 (ACLED 2024; International Crisis Group 2024). In some areas, federal administrative institutions have operated intermittently, relying heavily on security deployments rather than routine governance structures.

A similar pattern exists in Oromia, where the long-running insurgency involving the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has produced zones of limited federal control in rural areas (Human Rights Watch 2023; ACLED 2024).

Governance in these regions, Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia, which together account for a substantial share of Ethiopia’s territory and population and occupy a central place in the country’s political landscape, often depends on intermittent military operations rather than sustained administrative presence, as federal and regional security forces conduct repeated counter-insurgency campaigns against armed groups operating largely in rural areas (International Crisis Group 2023; Landinfo 2023; ACLED 2024).

The erosion of territorial governance has also been reflected in repeated episodes of targeted violence against civilians in several regions of the country. In parts of Oromia, armed groups have been implicated in attacks against ethnic Amhara communities and Orthodox Christian populations. For example, in June 2022, between 400 and 500 civilians were killed in the Gimbi district of West Wollega during an attack targeting Amhara residents, according to an investigation by Amnesty International (2022). Reports of continued violence have also emerged in subsequent years. In early 2026, at least 34 Orthodox Christians were reportedly killed in East Arsi, including victims targeted during religious gatherings (ECLJ, 2026). Conflict monitoring data further indicate sustained violence in the region, with more than 3,200 conflict-related fatalities recorded in Oromia during 2024 alone (ACLED, 2024).

Such incidents illustrate the broader governance challenge highlighted in this essay. When the state struggles to guarantee basic security for civilians across significant portions of its territory, the gap between formal sovereignty and effective governance becomes increasingly visible, one of the defining characteristics of what is described here as a zombie state.

The scale of violence and disruption associated with these conflicts further illustrates the depth of Ethiopia’s governance crisis. The Tigray war (2020–2022) alone is estimated to have caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, making it one of the deadliest conflicts of the twenty-first century (de Waal 2023; United Nations 2023). Armed confrontations in Amhara and Oromia since 2023 have continued to generate significant casualties and insecurity across large parts of the country (ACLED 2024). The conflicts have also produced massive humanitarian consequences. According to the International Organization for Migration, Ethiopia hosts millions of internally displaced persons, one of the largest internal displacement populations in the world (IOM 2024). In many conflict-affected regions, transportation between towns and regional centers has become highly restricted due to insecurity, while reports of kidnappings for ransom and the disruption of trade routes have further undermined local economies (International Crisis Group 2024). These conditions have contributed to sharp increases in food and commodity prices across several regions, exacerbating the humanitarian consequences of the conflict (World Bank 2024). Taken together, these developments underscore the widening gap between the formal architecture of the Ethiopian state and its practical capacity to provide security and economic stability across its territory.

Financial Life-Support and the Soft Budget Constraint

Ethiopia’s macroeconomic stability has increasingly depended on external financial support. In July 2024, the International Monetary Fund approved a four-year Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement worth about US$3.4 billion, aimed at stabilizing Ethiopia’s balance-of-payments pressures and supporting the government’s economic reform program (IMF 2024). The program forms part of a broader external financing package of roughly US$10.7 billion from development partners and creditors, intended to address macroeconomic imbalances and restore debt sustainability (IMF 2025). Subsequent program reviews have unlocked additional disbursements under the IMF arrangement, including several tranches of approximately US$260 million, bringing total disbursements to more than US$2 billion by 2026 (IMF 2026; Reuters 2025).

Bilateral partners have also played an important role. The United Arab Emirates provided $3 billion package to Ethiopia in 2018, including a US$1 billion deposit to Ethiopia’s central bank and broader aid and investment commitments intended to ease foreign-exchange shortages and stabilize the currency (Reuters 2018).

These financial interventions have occurred against the backdrop of rising sovereign debt pressures. Ethiopia defaulted on its US$1 billion Eurobond in late 2023 and subsequently entered negotiations with creditors under the G20 Common Framework, seeking restructuring of approximately US$8.4 billion in sovereign debt and several billion dollars in debt-service relief during the IMF program period (Reuters 2025).

These financial interventions resemble what János Kornai (1986) described as a soft budget constraint, in which institutions survive not because they are financially viable but because external resources repeatedly prevent collapse. In this sense, external financial flows operate as a form of institutional life-support, sustaining the Ethiopian state’s macroeconomic and diplomatic continuity even as its governing capacity remains strained by persistent internal conflict and fragmentation.

Governance Through Exception

Another indicator of institutional strain is the growing reliance on extraordinary security powers to manage political crises. Ethiopia has repeatedly governed through states of emergency that expand executive authority and suspend ordinary legal safeguards. During the escalation of the Tigray war, the federal government declared a nationwide state of emergency in November 2021, granting authorities sweeping powers to detain suspects without court warrants, conduct searches without judicial authorization, and impose wide-ranging security restrictions (Amnesty International 2021; U.S. Department of State 2022).

Similar measures were adopted during the conflict in Amhara in August 2023, when the government again invoked emergency powers following clashes between federal forces and Fano militia groups. The emergency proclamation authorized curfews, restrictions on movement and public gatherings, and expanded arrest powers for security forces (Reuters 2023; ACLED 2023).

Human-rights organizations have noted that these emergency frameworks allow authorities to impose sweeping restrictions on civil liberties and detain individuals without judicial oversight, underscoring the extraordinary scope of such powers (Amnesty International 2024).

Restrictions on freedom of expression and independent journalism provide another indicator of governance through exceptional measures. In recent years, journalists, media outlets, and political commentators have faced increasing arrests, suspensions, and legal prosecutions under security-related laws. International monitoring organizations have documented repeated detentions of journalists and the temporary closure of media outlets during periods of political tension (Committee to Protect Journalists 2024; Amnesty International 2024). Ethiopia’s ranking in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index has fluctuated sharply in recent years, reflecting persistent concerns regarding media freedom, arbitrary detentions, and restrictions on critical reporting (Reporters Without Borders 2024). While governments facing security crises often invoke national security considerations, the growing reliance on such measures has raised concerns among rights organizations that emergency powers and security laws are increasingly used to constrain dissenting voices and independent reporting.

The repeated resort to such exceptional governance mechanisms suggests increasing difficulty sustaining political order through ordinary constitutional procedures. In practice, emergency powers risk becoming a substitute for routine governance, reinforcing the pattern in which the state’s formal institutions remain intact even as normal administrative authority becomes increasingly strained.

The Education Sector and the Judiciary as Institutional Barometers

The condition of core public institutions provides another revealing indicator of state capacity. Institutions such as courts, schools, and universities play a central role in sustaining the rule of law, reproducing administrative expertise, and maintaining the social contract between citizens and the state. When these institutions cease to function consistently across the national territory, the long-term capacity of the state to govern effectively becomes severely constrained.

Ethiopia’s judicial system has faced increasing pressures in recent years. Reports from international monitoring organizations have raised concerns about the limited independence and effectiveness of courts, as well as the growing influence of executive authorities and security institutions in politically sensitive cases (Freedom House 2024; U.S. Department of State 2023). The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (2025) ranks Ethiopia among the lowest-performing countries globally in areas such as judicial independence, due process, and constraints on government powers, reflecting widespread concerns about the ability of courts to function as effective guardians of the rule of law.

At the same time, the education sector has experienced severe disruption as a result of recent conflicts. According to the Geneva Global Hub for Education in Emergencies and People in Need (2026), Ethiopia is experiencing an intense education crisis: “As of November 2025, roughly 7.2 million children were out of school, and over 9,000 schools had been damaged by conflict or natural disasters”. In several regions affected by armed violence, schooling has been intermittently halted for extended periods, disrupting the educational trajectory of an entire generation.

Universities have also faced significant institutional disruptions. During the Tigray war (2020–2022), institutions such as Mekelle University and Adigrat University were forced to suspend operations for extended periods as the conflict engulfed the region (Human Rights Watch 2021; UNESCO 2024). In parts of Amhara and Oromia, recurring insecurity has periodically disrupted academic calendars, limited student mobility, and complicated campus governance.

These disruptions carry broader implications beyond the education sector itself. Universities serve as key sites for the production of administrative, technical, and professional expertise necessary for the functioning of modern states. When higher education institutions experience prolonged instability, the state’s ability to reproduce skilled bureaucrats, teachers, engineers, and legal professionals becomes increasingly constrained.

The sector also faces growing brain drain pressures, as Ethiopian academics and highly trained professionals seek employment abroad amid political uncertainty, limited research funding, and concerns over institutional autonomy (World Bank 2023; African Development Bank 2024). Such trends risk further weakening the intellectual and technical foundations upon which state capacity ultimately depends.

Taken together, the erosion of judicial effectiveness alongside the disruption of educational institutions illustrates a broader pattern of institutional strain. Courts, schools, and universities are among the most fundamental pillars of modern statehood. When these institutions struggle to function consistently across the national territory, the gap between the formal architecture of the state and its practical governing capacity becomes increasingly pronounced.

Conclusion

Ethiopia’s current condition challenges conventional diagnoses of state fragility. The country has not experienced the wholesale collapse typically associated with classical state failure, yet neither does it display the institutional coherence normally associated with stable governance. The Addis Paradox, a capital projecting administrative vitality alongside a fragmented territorial order, captures this contradiction. Addis Ababa continues to function as a diplomatic hub and showcase of modernization, even as large parts of the country experience persistent conflict, civilian insecurity, and disrupted public institutions.

Viewed through this lens, Ethiopia increasingly resembles what this essay has described as a zombie state, a polity in which the institutional shell of sovereignty remains visible even as the practical foundations of governance are progressively hollowed out. Persistent armed conflicts across several regions, repeated reliance on emergency rule, external financial stabilization, and mounting strain on core institutions, from courts to schools and universities, collectively illustrate this pattern. The state continues to operate, but its capacity to guarantee security, administer territory, and sustain the social contract has become increasingly uneven.

If this diagnosis is correct, the central challenge facing Ethiopia may not be preventing state collapse but confronting the limits of incremental reform. Systems exhibiting zombie-state dynamics often persist precisely because their institutional arrangements lock political actors into patterns of competition that gradual reform cannot easily resolve. Ethiopia’s own history suggests that moments of deep systemic crisis have previously led to foundational political reconfiguration, most notably following the upheavals of 1974 and 1991.

If the widening gap between formal state structures and effective governance across the national territory continues to expand, Ethiopia may once again confront the need for a constitutional or governance reset capable of renegotiating the basic political settlement of the state. Whether such a reset emerges through deliberate negotiation or through the pressures of continuing crisis remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the sustainability of the current state model can no longer be taken for granted.

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